JUSTICE,
UPSIDE DOWN
How the
Judicial System of Costa Rica
Handled
the Case of the Villalobos Brothers
By Lic.
Jose Miguel Villalobos
As
Attorney for UCCR
25 March,
2004
PREAMBLE
During the
events that are accounted for in this
document, hundreds of those affected by the
illegitimate closing of the businesses of the
Villalobos Brothers organized themselves to
defend their interests. The group, called
UCCR, worked out a strategy based on
demonstrating the non-guilt of the Villalobos
Brothers in order to facilitate his return to
the country and to achieve the reimbursement
to investors of their legitimate resources.
Other sectors have attempted to file claims
against the Villalobos in spite of the fact
that don Luis Enrique is not detained, and by
doing so have facilitated the Prosecutor's
strategy and have affected the process for the
reimbursement of monies. However, in the end,
we all share the same objective, which is the
recovery of the funds.
INTRODUCTION
The document
you are about to read is not fiction. It is
rather an elaborate, detailed account of how
the Justice Department of Costa Rica has acted
in the case against two citizens of this
country, Luis Enrique and Osvaldo Villalobos
Camacho. Despite the gravity of these
denounced actions, all protests against them
have thus far not merited the attention of the
authorities for judicial inspection nor even
of the press. Possibly this is because they
think only the interests of a group of
investors, mostly foreigners, are involved.
Nonetheless, the issue is much more crucial
than that. We have a Prosecuting Attorney for
Drug Trafficking delving into alleged
financial crimes and a Judge of Rights who's
only concern is infringing on the rights of
the accused, going so far as to violate his
own legal resolutions. Ten million colones
disappear during a seizure of assets and the
authorities do not even bother to investigate
those responsible. The operation of the
Justice Department is public in nature,
although privacy might be an issue for those
who appear before it. Therefore, we do not
believe these actions should be covered up,
because doing so would make us accomplices to
abuses of power, which weaken the credibility
of the Supreme Court and its officials.
Actions like these endanger those who properly
carry out their duties, and undermine the
dignity of the highest-ranking officials of
the Prosecutor's Office.
The document
that you are receiving is without error. We
have evidence of its veracity, and we quote
the pages of the legal record to back up our
statements. We trust that, although some
self-righteous and hypocritical dignitaries
might be appalled at anyone who would question
Prosecutors and Judges, the majority are
capable of reasoning and defending with
constructive criticism our legal
institutions. Merely ignoring an injustice
will not make it go away; rather, this
attitude will cause it to multiply and thus
favor the impunity of those guilty of
committing it. Judicial officials are our
guardians, and therefore their malpractice is
one of the most dangerous behaviors for all
citizens, for we are at the mercy of those who
defend us.
If you think
it cannot happen to you, remember the words of
the Nazi concentration camp survivor, Pastor
Niemoller, who wrote:
"In Germany
they first came for the Communists, and I
didn't speak up because I wasn't a Communist.
Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't
speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they
came for the trade unionists, and I didn't
speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist.
Then they came for the Catholics, and I didn't
speak up because I was a Protestant. Then
they came for me - and by that time no one was
left to speak up."
The
aggressions that are inflicted on one human
being are suffered by all. The bells of
injustice ring not only for the offended; they
ring for him, for you, for me, and for all
people of good faith.
FIRST
POINT:
Prosecutor
Espinoza knew about the request from the
Government of Canada before his ranking
superior did, and acted prior to having
official authority to do so.
The Letter of
Request sent by the Canadian Government asking
for the cooperation of the legal authorities
in Costa Rica arrived at the Chancellery on
June 25, 2002. Action was immediately taken
on the letter, and on July 3 of that same
year, it was made known to the Attorney
General of Costa Rica, at that time, Lic.
Carlos Arias, in whose office the letter was
received at 10:00 that same day [all times
herein are in the 24-hour clock method, unless
otherwise noted], as recorded in the receipt
records of that office. By order of the
Attorney General, the document was handed over
to the Narcotics Prosecutor's Office, directed
by Prosecutor Walter Espinoza, at 10:35 that
same July 3, for him to take due action. Thus
far, the handling of the case appears to be
normal. However, Prosecutor Espinoza handed
the Letter of Request from the Canadian
Government over to Judge Francisco Sánchez at
9:00 that same day; that is, he acted an
hour and a half before officially receiving
the note from the Attorney General. Lic.
Walter Espinoza therefore had in his hands the
Letter of Request from the Canadian Government
before the Secretariat of the Supreme Court of
Justice delivered it to the Attorney General,
thus totally violating the internal hierarchy
of the Judicial Power and encroaching upon the
authority of the highest rank of the Attorney
General of Costa Rica.
We should ask
ourselves how Prosecutor Espinoza obtained
that document before his own superior
officially sent it on and what the reasons
were for such a hasty, abrupt action. For
now, suffice it to say, that it is clear that
Prosecutor Espinoza sent the request to Judge
Francisco Sánchez before receiving the
documents from the Attorney General, and it
must be assumed that, in fact, he had them in
his hands substantially before then, since he
had enough time to read them and write up a
request dozens of pages long, which could not
have been done in a just few minutes. At the
very least, Prosecutor Espinoza had had access
to that documentation several days prior to
that moment, which would have given him time
to prepare the request even before his own
superior learned of it. That can easily be
proven, as shown in the following point.
SECOND
POINT:
Official
authorities from the Government of Canada
communicated with Prosecutor Espinoza using
unofficial channels to coordinate
collaborative actions before the Attorney
General had received the Letter of Request for
Cooperation and those same Canadian
authorities delivered that document using
informal methods and concealing their actions.
In the
Supreme Court file, which refers to the Letter
of Request sent by the Canadian Government,
there is a copy of the note sent by Mr.
Gustavo Alvarez, a staff member of the
Canadian Embassy in Bogota, Colombia.
Significantly, that note is dated June 21,
2002, that is, four days before the Chancery
of Costa Rica officially received the Letter
of Request from the Canadian Government. In
that mysterious letter, Alvarez, the staff
member of the Canadian Embassy in Colombia,
advises Prosecutor Espinoza, bypassing his
superiors, that two investigators from that
country will arrive on July 2 to coordinate
some operations.
Those
operations, through the indicated date and the
sender, refer to the Letter of Request, which
had not yet been received and much less acted
upon in Costa Rica. In other words, even
before the Canadians had officially acted, one
of their staff members in another country had
communicated with the legal authorities in
Costa Rica for the purpose of coordinating
what had not yet been requested, hence failing
to respect his own Embassy in this country and
the hierarchy of the Judicial Power and the
Chancery. But the matter went beyond a simple
violation of formalities, which itself was
serious and unusual enough. Staff member
Alvarez, from Bogota, Colombia, sends out
information in Spanish and English describing
a Legal Mutual Assistance Agreement between
Canada and Costa Rica for carrying out
investigative work in this country. That
statement is absolutely false, as both the
Canadian staff member and Prosecutor Espinoza
well know. That "Agreement" does not exist,
not only because it has not been signed, but
because it refers to the participation of the
Ministry of Justice of Costa Rica, which has
no jurisdiction in investigative, police or
judicial tasks. Let us analyze the facts that
show why the Canadian staff member was not
telling the truth. It is evident that the
documentation sent on June 21 was the Letter
of Request, which had not yet arrived through
diplomatic channels, but which Prosecutor
Espinoza knew about before his superiors did.
The Canadian staff member is untruthful, for
which an explanation ought to be provided by
the Embassy of Canada. But even more grave is
the fact that Prosecutor Walter Espinoza would
receive documents and act before being
authorized to do so by the Supreme Court of
Justice and his immediate superior, the
Attorney General. Since June 21 he had time
to prepare the request that was received by
Judge Sánchez on July 3, all before the
Attorney General had knowledge of the
Canadians' request.
By his
actions Prosecutor Espinoza assumes powers he
did not possess; he disdains the Supreme
Court, by acting before it had any knowledge
of the Letter of Request; he bypassed the
Chancery itself by maintaining contact with a
friendly country through extra-official
channels; and he took upon himself a case of
this magnitude before his own immediate
superior assigned it to him. Thus, the legal
violations committed by the Prosecutor are
excessively numerous.
THIRD
POINT:
The Canadian
Embassy never requested a raid of the offices
of the Villalobos Brothers, but Prosecutor
Espinoza convinced the Judge in charge of the
case and also the national press, that such a
request existed.
Once the
Letter of Request was officially received, its
content was known, and it can be concluded
that in no way did the request for the
cooperation made by the Canadian Government
involve raiding the Villalobos brothers'
offices. Pages 18, 19 and 20 of the Letter
containing the cooperation requests make
absolutely no mention of raiding those
offices. The request for a raid is limited to
the condominium of the Canadian citizens, who
were staying at Jacó de Garabito, for the
purpose of seizing documents at that
location. Because the Canadian authorities
were interested in locating any information
related to the bank accounts of those
individuals in Costa Rica, their requests were
not limited to obtaining information on
possible deposits with the Villalobos
Brothers; they were asking for all types of
reports on any transactions made in this
country.
A careful
reading of that Letter of Request will show
that the Government of Canada never had in
mind a raid of the Ofinter offices and those
of Mr. Luis Enrique Villalobos, but rather
they were requesting a raid on the condominium
of the Canadians under investigation in their
country, as well as information on any
relative banking or financial transactions in
Costa Rica, and not exclusively information on
possible operations with Luis Enrique
Villalobos. Nevertheless, Prosecutor Espinoza
requested in his written communication,
received at the Preliminary Criminal Court at
9:00 on July 3, 2002, that the Villalobos
brothers' offices be raided and that all
documents, books, accounting statements,
monies and other items related to the alleged
investigations be seized and held. On folio
107 of the court file, Prosecutor Espinosa, in
his request to the Judge, asks for a raid and
search of the Ofinter offices and the
sequester of any information having to do with
to the Canadian citizens under investigation,
but at no time did the Prosecutor manifest the
same eagerness in soliciting information
concerning the financial transactions of those
Canadians in other Banks or financial
establishments in the country. This reveals
that he used the Letter of Request merely as a
pretext to target his forces against the
Villalobos brothers, so he made his actions
coincide with the Canadian's request and
transformed the matter into an international
issue. With that conduct he has involved the
Canadian Government in an investigation it did
not request, and has been untruthful in his
written communications to the preliminary
Judge, by trying to link the Canadian
investigation of several of its citizens with
his own criminal vendetta against Osvaldo and
Luis Enrique Villalobos.
FOURTH
POINT:
The Chancellery
of Costa Rica altered the essence of the
request from the Government of Canada and
gravely modified its contents, and Prosecutor
Espinoza hid that information from the Penal
Judge.
The Letter of
Request sent by the Canadian Government
clearly establishes that it is a request for
cooperation on the part of the Judicial Power
of Costa Rica in an ongoing police
investigation in that country, pointing out
that at that time no charges had been brought
against anyone. The Interim Judicial Director
of the Chancery altered the thrust of the
note, officiously categorizing it as a request
for legal cooperation and stating that it was
a case against several Canadian citizens, even
though the note from Canada was absolutely
clear in that it was a simple police
investigation, that at that time there was no
case and that no charges had been brought
against those individuals. Moreover, the
Supreme Court repeats the error initiated by
the Chancery, categorizing the Letter of
Request in like manner. But what is really
unacceptable, is that Prosecutor Espinoza, who
had supposedly read the letter in its
entirety, in his request of the Criminal
Judge, would almost completely transcribe the
Canadians' request verbatim, except for the
phrase found on all pages, which explains that
it has to do with an ongoing investigation and
that no charges have been leveled against the
individuals in question. It is not believable
that this was just a careless mistake on the
part of the Prosecutor; rather it is obvious
he had intended to mislead the Judge and make
him believe that the letter was about a court
case in Canada, which was totally false.
FIFTH
POINT:
Prosecutor
Espinoza had prior information about the
operations of the Villalobos Brothers for
several years, and without new evidence, had
the Letter of Request for Cooperation coincide
with the start of the investigation.
Since May 11,
2000, Prosecutor Walter Espinoza had knowledge
of the matter related to the operations of the
Villalobos brothers. On that date he received
official letter SUGEF-2310-2000-03 signed by
the then General Intendant of Financial
Entities, Helberth Pineda Solís, notifying him
of the case referred to as the Villalobos
Brothers Case and another dated July 20
numbered 3358-2000-03. The investigation was
initiated by reason of an official letter sent
by the Banco Crédito Agrícola de Cartago,
which informed the Superintendence of frequent
checks being cashed at that bank by the
brothers Luis Enrique and Osvaldo
Villalobos-Camacho. The report mentions
possible fund gathering in dollars at a
business location in San Pedro de Montes Oca.
Time passes
with no progress with respect to the
Prosecutor's concerns, and meanwhile the
banking and financial oversight authorities
repeatedly request information from the
Ofinter business without establishing any
liability on the part of any of its
representatives. On March 19, 2002 (almost
two years after the first references to the
case), Mr. Adolfo Rodríguez-Herrera, General
Superintendent ofSecurities, sends to the
Attorney General a simple document reporting
on risky operations being conducted by the
stock brokerage, Mercado de Valores Puesto de
Bolsa, S.A.
The
Superintendent, instead of opening an
administrative investigation against the
mentioned brokerage, orders an investigation
of the firms that allegedly were investing in
the brokerages. Surprisingly, the Attorney
General Carlos Arias, the next day sends the
document to the Narcotics Prosecutor, Walter
Espinoza, and transforms the letter from
Superintendent Rodríguez into a charge of
possible money laundering. That is absolutely
false, since the note from Rodríguez cannot be
construed as a charge at all in that sense,
making the Attorney General's categorization
truly astounding. The case is even more
absurd considering that it cannot be inferred
from Prosecutor Arias's note who the possible
guilty parties of that alleged money
laundering could have been. Prosecutor
Espinoza was so confused by that note that he
ordered the Rapid Processing Unit of the
Public Ministry to assign a unique number to
the case against "Unknown" and for the
crime of "Drug Trafficking."
Yes, that's right. As far as Prosecutor
Espinoza was concerned, at that time there was
no evidence whatsoever of any crime committed
by Luis Enrique and Osvaldo
Villalobos-Camacho, so much so that he
received the note from his superior and for
two months thereafter, he went about trying to
open the case without finding anyone to
charge. That is how the case began. One can
actually read on the cover of the file for
Case 02-008579-042-PE that it is against "Unknown"
for the crime of "Money Laundering,"
and that was a month before the raid and
sequester that took place at the Villalobos
brothers' offices. It is obvious that as of
May 27, Prosecutor Espinoza did not so much as
suspect those men, even though he had been
familiar with the case for two years prior to
that time.
SIXTH
POINT:
Prosecutor
Espinoza, after learning through unofficial
channels of the Letter of Request for
Cooperation, asks CICAD (Joint Center of
Anti-Drug Intelligence) to prepare a report
about the Villalobos Brothers' case, with the
intent to have it coincide with the procedural
delivery of that Letter.
In the file
there is a note dated July 1, 2002, received
in Prosecutor Espinoza's office that same
date, Official Letter UAF-045-02-38-1999,
through which the Joint Narcotics Intelligence
Center (CICAD) submits its findings after
updating the information on the Villalobos
brothers as of October 2001. It presents
eight conclusions, after 34 pages, and none of
them even considers a possible relationship to
the crime of money laundering. CICAD merely
presents the list of immovable assets
belonging to what it calls the Associated
Enterprises of the Villalobos Brothers,
erroneously indicating that they cover an area
of 7,500 square kilometers (which is actually
bigger than the area of San Jose Province!).
It also states that the Villalobos brothers
engage in financial intermediation, describing
the interest rate at which funds are gathered,
without even mentioning any possible
illegality. It speaks of a heavy flow of
funds, without conjecturing as to the possible
causes or offering any opinions. That report
contains no reference to possible illicit
activities, and much less any having to do
with money laundering; nor do the
investigators ask the Prosecutor for more time
to finish the work that was assigned to them.
Thus, as of that date, there was no evidence,
nor even suspicions, of any criminal activity,
despite the fact that CICAD had been
conducting the corresponding investigations
for a long time before that.
In spite of
all this, Prosecutor Espinoza, on July 1,
presents to the Preliminary Criminal Court a
request for a raid, search, sequester, seizure
of items and other things, against the
Villalobos Brothers' assets. In that petition
he mixes the contents of the Letter of Request
from Canada with alleged internal
investigations, which he neither describes nor
details, and information internally gathered,
also not described, to justify the request.
The first 15 pages are nothing more than a
copy of the Letter of Request, from which the
Prosecutor omits the Canadians' clarification
that it involved no legal cases but rather a
police investigation and that the individuals
under investigation were Canadian citizens and
not the Villalobos brothers. Starting half
way down on page 15 until page 32, the
document merely transcribes the CICAD report
mentioned above but indicates no crimes. It
must be pointed out that Prosecutor Espinoza
states that the information had come from
SUGEF, SUGEVAL and CICAD, when actually only
the latter is true. The SUGEF had actually
produced a lengthy file beginning in March
2001, which indicates that the Villalobos
brothers were not involved in financial
intermediation activities, according to the
official letter from SUGEF's Legal Consultancy
Office, DAJ-074-2002, dated June 12, 2002. In
other words, less than a month before the
Prosecutor's request for the raid, the
technical experts in that discipline had
stated that they had detected no crime of
illegal financial intermediation. That fact
was reiterated before the Prosecutor himself
by the Superintendent of Financial Entities in
April 2003, which shows that Walter Espinoza
had been untruthful before the Criminal
Judge. In reference to SUGEVAL, there is only
a note calling for the investigation of the
money movements, which had been received by
the Prosecutor way back in March. The part
about CICAD is the report we described.
The only
input from Espinoza is the statement that
Ofinter gathers funds from investors, which
had already been stated by CIDAD and, in and
of itself, is not an illegal activity. This
can be verified by comparing the Prosecutor's
report with the CICAD report and noting that
99 percent of it is the same document, found
in the appendix to the copy of the Canadians'
Letter of Request. Despite such weak
justification, the Prosecutor requests from
the Judge and is granted a raid and search of
the Ofinter offices, owned by the Villalobos
Brothers, as well as the sequester of any
physical and material evidence relevant to the
case. He includes in the request the
confiscation of money found on the premises,
irrespective of who it belonged to. What is
really striking about this is that he does not
ask the banks for information pertaining to
the Canadians sought by the Canadian
Government, even though that is precisely what
was requested, but rather only seeks
information related to the Villalobos
brothers.
The
Prosecutor presents no evidence whatsoever to
justify his requests, and the Judge consents
without prior, serious review.
SEVENTH
POINT:
Judge Francisco
Sánchez authorizes the petitions from the
Prosecutor in record time.
Judge Sánchez
receives Prosecutor Espinoza's request at 9:00
on July 3, 2002, and by 13:00, he has not only
read the respective documentation but has
issued a resolution. There were 70 folios,
including the Letter of Request, but with an
agility worthy of a much more important case,
someone read all of that information,
interpreted it, made a decision on it and
drafted an entire 13-page resolution
concerning it. Amazingly, in the heading of
that resolution the Judge indicates that he
has decided on the request after analyzing it,
which is obviously not true considering
material and time limitations.
EIGHTH
POINT:
Of the sums
confiscated from the Offices of OFINTER,
property of the Villalobos Brothers, Ten
Million Three Hundred Thirty-One Thousand
Colones disappeared, without any explanations
to this day about this situation from
Prosecutor Espinoza.
On July 4,
2002, the Ofinter offices were raided,
confiscating a large sum of cash, which was
put in charge of the Prosecutor's office. The
Judge responsible for the action was Licda.
Cindy Williams, who had a large number of
officials from the Judicial Power accompany
her. The 16-page search warrant was issued at
21:15. Everything that was seized is properly
documented, except for the sum of 10,331,000
colones, which do not appear as deposited in
the Court accounts, nor is the Prosecutor able
to explain the whereabouts of that money.
Page 10 of the Search Warrant mentions that
amount of paper money was found in a small
safe, but no one will assume the
responsibility of explaining what subsequently
happened to the money. The money was lost at
the time the judicial agents were on the scene
and raided the offices; there is a record that
the money was found at the location, but it
was evidently not deposited in the Judicial
Power accounts. This is no small amount, but
even if it were, the Prosecutor and the Judge
in charge are obligated to explain its
whereabouts and divulge who is responsible for
its disappearance.
NINTH
POINT:
The Prosecutor
insists in the Press that all the money is
located in the accounts of the Judiciary.
On August 6,
2003, Prosecutor Espinoza publicly referred to
the complaint about money allegedly
disappearing during the raid and categorically
stated that the amounts of money in their
entirety are deposited in the Judicial Power
accounts, producing the respective deposit
slips. Once again Prosecutor Espinoza is
untruthful, being that the amount of
10,331,000 colones does not appear as
deposited in those accounts, despite the fact
that it does appear as seized in the records
of the raid.
TENTH
POINT:
Prosecutor
Espinoza commits serious errors of addition
and retracts information he had provided in
regards to the deposited funds.
On June 9,
2003, Prosecutor Espinoza responded to an
investor's request by stating that the
entirety of the money deposited in the
accounts of the Costa Rican Anti-Drug
Institute (ICD), is US$204,189. Nonetheless,
on August 6 he had to acknowledge that there
were actually 56,000 dollars more, since he
had had failed to add correctly, and that had
occurred without the 10,331,000 colones
showing up yet. It is difficult to trust an
office whose calculator works so poorly in
such sizeable amounts and where those
responsible constantly change their statements
without explaining the reasons for their
errors.
ELEVENTH
POINT:
The Prosecutor
requests and the Judge concedes the holding of
financial assets and the freezing of accounts
of the companies related to the Villalobos
Brothers, affecting the rights and interests
of the investors without due process.
Right from
July 3, Prosecutor Espinoza requested the
freezing of the accounts and the
immobilization and sequester of the money
confiscated from the Villalobos brothers'
offices. The raid is supposedly justified by
alleged crimes of money laundering and illegal
financial intermediation. Although no legal
regulation to back up the action was cited,
the Judge went right ahead and authorized the
confiscation of those funds anyway.
Sufficient was a reference to an alleged
operation with some Canadian citizens, under
police, not judicial, investigation, to freeze
the totality of the funds of thousands of
investors who had nothing at all to do with
the case. No reference whatsoever was made of
the knowledge that the Villalobos brothers
might have had of the Canadian operations, nor
was any consideration given to the fact that a
month earlier the SUGEF itself had established
that they found no evidence of illegal
financial intermediation. Nonetheless, a mere
invention of the Prosecutor sufficed to freeze
the funds of third parties. The Prosecutor
could have requested information concerning
the Canadians or investigated the destination
of the funds gathered, but instead, with the
help of the Judge, who should have been a
guarantor of rights, he closed a business that
had been operating smoothly for over 18 years.
TWELFTH
POINT:
The Prosecutor
is arbitrary in the application of the Law,
because similar cases are handled in a
different manner.
The gathering
funds from the public by non-authorized
entities or individuals in Costa Rica is not a
crime. It becomes illegal whenever it can be
proven that the destination of those funds is
for money lending or investment in stocks and
bonds. That is why the SUGEF always deemed
that the Villalobos brothers had not committed
that crime. It is well known that the same
activity of fund gathering up until that time
was being conducted publicly by Luis Milanés
and his firm Savings Unlimited and Vinir, S.A.,
owned by Vinicio Esquivel, who was involved in
fund gathering in exchange for the payment of
interest, without the authorization of the
government regulatory entity. However, the
Attorney General at that time had never
investigated Milanés, but rather allowed him
to continue to operate. But with Mr. Esquivel
the situation is much worse, because he
continues to operate in the country and openly
states to the national press that he has been
gathering funds for years without legal
authorization, without it concerning the
Attorney General in the least. The law ought
to be applied equally to all, regardless of
whether legal authorities are dealing with
friends or acquaintances. If the Attorney
General considers that mere fund gathering
without legal authorization is tantamount to
the crime of illegal financial intermediation,
then he should have, right from the onset of
investigating those who engage in such
activities, intervened in their operations,
raided their businesses and possibly pressed
criminal charges against them. The Attorney
General has been arbitrary in applying the
law, in that he has only exercised his powers
against the Villalobos brothers, in spite of
the fact that he had at his disposal that case
along with technical reports indicating that
no crime was being committed. It is even
worse when a bad government official is also
arbitrary, or more specifically, the worst
government official is not the most ignorant
but rather the most arbitrary.
THIRTEENTH
POINT:
Prosecutor
Espinoza processes a criminal accusation of
more than 127 people in less than three days.
On Friday,
September 26, 2003, the attorney Edwald Acuña-Blanco,
representing more than 120 people, files a
lawsuit against the brothers Osvaldo and Luis
Enrique Villalobos-Camacho for the crime of
fraud. The document submitted, which is over
70 pages long (although it is practically all
taken up with lists of the plaintiffs), was
received in the Attorney General's office at
14:00, as indicated by the receipt form of
that entity. By the following Monday, that
is, in less than one half a business day,
Prosecutor Espinoza had reviewed the entire
document, verifying compliance with the
provisions of the Criminal Process Code.
Believe it or not, by 8:00 a.m. on Monday,
September 29, less than half a business day
after attorney Acuña's request, Prosecutor
Espinoza ruled to accept the case and proceed
with the public lawsuit. That is not only
impossible; it is also objectionable. Lic.
Espinoza cannot logically affirm that he
worked all weekend on a lawsuit filed by
private individuals for a possible crime of
fraud, when he is the Narcotics Prosecutor.
Such swiftness is uncommon with that
Prosecutor in particular, and in the Court in
general, and reflects an absolutely
preferential treatment of matters arising from
those who seek to denounce and sue the
Villalobos-Camacho brothers. When it comes to
defense matters, the decision is delayed and
normal procedures are affected, but a lawsuit
for alleged fraud filed by over 120 people is
somehow given this impressive, speedy
treatment.
FOURTEENTH
POINT:
The Prosecutor's
Office attempts to intimidate an investor who
has questioned its action and deprives him of
his freedom in an arbitrary manner.
On August 21,
2003, the OIJ supposedly received a complaint
from Mr. Francisco Sánchez-Fallas against Mr.
M. Shizard, for alleged threats. The data
entry operator of that entity, Mr. Marco
Andrés Brenes-Durán, assigns to the case the
unique code 03-016146-042-PE, according to
him, at the request of Mr. Gustavo Porras from
the Section of Miscellaneous Crimes of the OIJ.
He even states that the complaint was filed
personally by Mr. Sánchez-Fallas at 4:11
(understood to be a.m. because if it had been
the afternoon, the time would have been
indicated as 16:11). That same day, OIJ Agent
Gustavo Porras-González transfers the
complaint to the Coordinating Prosecutor of
the Specialized Unit of Miscellaneous Crimes
of the Public Ministry, classifying it as
URGENT. On Friday, August 25, just four days
later, Mr. Shizard is arrested, taking from
him a statement, and he is immediately
handcuffed and taken to an OIJ jail cell, in
spite of the fact that he was still recovering
from an operation.
This incident
is incredible because Mr. Francisco
Sánchez-Fallas has never denounced Mr. Shizard
and much less the on day and hour falsely
indicated by Mr. Brenes Durán, the OIJ data
entry operator. It is certainly
preposterous to conceive that at four o'clock
in the morning Judge Sánchez, the judge
over the Villalobos brothers' case, would be
filing charges at the OIJ. What Judge Sánchez
actually did was to send to the Superior
Council of the Judicial Power a note on August
19, making known several letters sent by Mr.
Shizard and which did not please him, with the
purpose, not of criminally indicting anyone,
but to make sure that care was taken so that
those incidents did not happen again in the
future. The title page of the file of the
case against Mr. Shizard indicates that the
plaintiff is Francisco Sánchez-Fallas,
although no complaint has been made and the
record prepared by the OIJ is totally false.
To this day, the case is dead, and Judge
Sánchez has not ratified any indictment. This
is just one more case of arbitrary actions and
falsehoods contained in the documentation of a
legal file. The purpose is clear: to
intimidate any investor who would even think
about vehemently defending his or her rights,
as Mr. Shizard did before he was so
barbarously accused. A foreigner still
hurting from a fresh operation is arrested and
held in an OIJ jail cell for a nonexistent
accusation and a case is initiated against him
for an act that is no longer a crime. Yes,
even that, because the criminality for threats
had been repealed many years before.
Ignorance mixed with arbitrariness and the
abuse of power, are, disgustingly commonplace
in the case we have before us.
FIFTEENTH
POINT:
The Prosecutor's
case is absolutely weak, for the crime of
illegal financial intermediation, for fraud,
and in regards to the freezing of monies.
Financial
Intermediation.
As for the
Villalobos-Camacho brothers, they are accused
of committing the crime of illegal financial
intermediation, contemplated in Article 157,
clause a) of the Organic Law of the Central
Bank of Costa Rica, which relates to Article
116 of the second paragraph of the same law.
The mentioned
article 157, which prescribes imprisonment of
three to six years for anyone who "engages
in unauthorized financial intermediation,"
is completed in Article 116, the second
paragraph, which defines financial
intermediation as the gathering of financial
resources from the public in a habitual
manner, for the purpose of investing them, at
the intermediary's expense and risk, in any
type of lending or in securities, irrespective
of the contractual or legal mode or the type
of document, electronic record or any similar
means employed in the transactions."
Observe what
the legal definitions that apply in this case
require: Not only is it necessary to engage in
habitual fund gathering, but also to invest
those funds in something specific, expressly
defined by the legislature -any form of money
lending or investment in stocks and bonds. It
is not enough that funds be gathered for the
purpose of investing them; the legislature
stipulates that the investment must be made in
some form of money lending or be backed by
stocks and bonds (securities). Any other form
of investment made with the gathered funds
does not constitute financial intermediation,
and therefore, to engage in those activities
without legal authorization does not
constitute a crime, and it is an
unsanctionable act from the legal standpoint.
In the case
of the Villalobos brothers, the prosecution
has been referring to illegal financial
intermediation as if it meant merely gathering
funds and paying interest, in flagrant
disregard for the rest of the description of
the type of crime as presented above, and what
is clearly stated in Article 116 of the
Organic Law of the Central Bank. In all the
cases in which the Public Minister and the
Criminal Office have cited the crime of
illegal financial intermediation prior to
January 2004, they have ignored the legal
destination of the funds, acting in total
negligence with respect to the real legal
definition, justifying the preventive custody
of the accused Osvaldo Villalobos-Camacho on
the mere grounds of fund gathering from the
public. We may cite many requests made by the
prosecutor and judicial resolutions, but all
of them are summarized on folio 2 of the writ
of extension of preventive custody dictated by
the Criminal Court of San Jose at 13:00 on May
27, 2003:
"The
investigations conducted based on the
documentation and reports obtained from the
raid and search carried out in the mentioned
month [referring to July 2002], try to
demonstrate the likelihood that through the
OFINTER S.A. firm and other related businesses
and enterprises, Mr. Osvaldo
Villalobos-Camacho was involved in the
activity of illegal financial intermediation,
that is, in the gathering funds from public
investors and paying interest in exchange, all
without such activities being registered with
the Superintendence of Financial Entities and
without the oversight of that agency."
It is quite
evident that the Criminal Court persists in
only partially interpreting the type of crime,
making legal acts illegal, that is, violating
the true intent of the law and infringing on
the personal liberty of the defendants, the
Villalobos-Camacho brothers. It is impossible
that at this stage of the game those
responsible are incapable of reading the law
correctly. One can easily deduce from
articles 116 and 157 of the Organic Law of the
Central Bank that the described conduct
requires that the funds gathered be used for a
particular purpose, that is, money lending or
investment in securities. To assert, as in
the quoted resolution, that the mere gathering
of funds and payment of interest constitutes
the crime, is reckless and misleading.
Delving more
deeply into this matter, the General
Superintendent of Financial Entities, Mr.
Bernardo Alfaro, testified before Prosecutor
Espinoza stating that the actions of the
Villalobos brothers could not be classified as
the crime of illegal financial intermediation
since the funds were not used for the purposes
specified in the respective articles.
Prosecutor
Espinoza and the Criminal Justice Office are
also attempting to classify the
Villalobos-Camacho brothers' actions as money
laundering. The Criminal Justice Office
asserts in the above-mentioned resolution
issued at 13:00 last May 27 that the
accusation "is based on the fact that
through the structure of financial
intermediation established through OFINTER,
money derived from serious crimes including
drug trafficking that were mobilized for the
purpose of covering up their illicit origin
and thus favoring those involved in such
criminal activities . . . , probably mobilized
funds arising from the drug trafficking of
Henry St. Onge and Sandra St. Onge, people
accused of drug trafficking in Canada."
These
assertions of the Criminal Court are nothing
more than mechanical repetitions of Prosecutor
Espinoza's flimsy arguments, and do not line
up with the truth of the documentation
contained in the legal case file. What gave
rise to the case in the first place was the
request from the Canadian Government for
international cooperation in ordering the
intervention and search of the St. Onges'
residences in Costa Rica, and the offices of
the Villalobos-Camacho brothers, supposedly
because it was needful for the investigation
conducted by that country. Surprisingly, the
letter of request sent by the Canadian
Government is not included in the file, but
rather is transcribed according to the
interests of the Prosecutor in his request,
and curiously, the Criminal Justice Office
takes it up in the same manner. But at the
bottom of each page of the actual letter of
request, one finds the following
clarification:
"All of the
information contained in this request is part
of a police investigation and consists of
unproven allegations."
Moreover,
from the Prosecutor's petition one gathers
that Mr. St. Onge has not been accused of any
crime in Canada; what it states is that he was
convicted of a crime in the United States in
1976 (!!!), for conspiracy to import
marihuana, but the sentence was suspended. In
other words, the Criminal Court is untruthful
when it states in its resolution that extends
the time of preventive custody for Osvaldo
Villalobos that St. Onge is accused of drug
trafficking in Canada, when in reality, that
man died on March 10, 2002, thus making it
impossible to investigate him. The letter of
request itself clearly states that what was
under police -not judicial- investigation was
an assumption impossible to prove:
"The Royal
Mounted Police of Canada opines that the money
will be used in a short while to finance the
purchase of a large quantity of cocaine to be
smuggled into Canada."
There is no
evidence at all that the St. Onges' money had
come from any crime, since no crime had even
been proven in their country, and therefore it
is not possible to charge the Villalobos
brothers with money laundering when there is
no money to launder.
And what is
even graver is the fact that after raiding the
St. Onges' condominium in Jacó, absolutely
no evidence was found that would link
those Canadians with the business of the
Villalobos-Camacho brothers. What was
actually confiscated was a savings passbook
and a checkbook which shown that they managed
their funds legally -- until the contrary can
be proven -- through the Banco Nacional de
Costa Rica. Thus it is truly astounding
that Prosecutor Espinoza and the Criminal
Court have not show the same care, enthusiasm
and eagerness to place the staff of the
national bank under preventive custody and
freeze the accounts of that banking
institution. It is clear, then, after 18
months of investigation, including raids on
the Canadians' condominium and the offices of
the Villalobos-Camacho brothers, that there is
no evidence whatsoever that links them.
In the
above-mentioned judicial resolution, the
Criminal Court states that monies arising from
serious crimes, even drug trafficking, have
been mobilized, and throughout the case file
only the St. Onges are mentioned, one of whom
passed away 3 months prior to the initial
request from Canada, and who could no longer
be the object of a police investigation,
unless they intend to violate the rights of
the deceased. What exactly are the other
serious crimes whose proceeds are mobilized
through the Villalobos brothers enterprises?
Who are the perpetrators of those "grave
crimes" referred to by the Criminal Justice
Office citing no more than a dead man and his
surviving wife, whose savings were mobilized
through a branch of the Banco Nacional de
Costa Rica in Jacó?
Of course,
the Prosecutor could respond by saying that he
has other evidence to warrant the continuance
of the case under investigation, but no such
explanation is found in the case file. It is
evident that his response would be
inappropriate for a matter of such magnitude.
Neither would it be appropriate to respond
that in order to support the case, he is
investigating all persons who deposited money
through the Villalobos brothers, with which it
would be found that there is no case at all
for money laundering, since for this criminal
charge one must prove the commission of a
felony that would make it necessary to
legitimize that capital with the intent of
concealing its illegal origin. If by now he
has not established so much as one felony
committed by the over 6,000 investors, what is
reflected is the reckless and arbitrary
behavior of the Prosecutor and the Criminal
Court to the detriment of the Villalobos
brothers.
Weakness of the
charges for illegal financial intermediation.
Article 157,
subsection a) of the Organic Law of the
Central Bank establishes a prison sentence of
three to six years for anyone involved in
unauthorized financial intermediation, which
is classified as the crime of "illegal
financial intermediation." The objective
classification is constituted by the
definition of financial intermediation, which
is not some abstract or subjective concept to
be liberally filled in by the judge and much
less by the Prosecutor. To even begin a case
for this crime, one must have a clear
understanding of the legal definition of
financial intervention, because it does not
suffice to merely engage in financial
activities without legal authorization, but
rather to indict a person for this crime, the
activities involved in the financial
intermediation must be precisely those set
forth in the law.
Therefore, it
is perfectly possible to engage in financial
activities without the authorization of the
SUGEF and still not commit a crime, simply
because those do not fall under the legal
classification of financial intermediation.
Article 116
of the Organic Law of the Central Bank sets
forth the precise concept of financial
intermediation as follows:
"For the
purposes of this law, financial intermediation
is understood to be the habitual gathering of
financial resources from the public, for
the purpose of using them, at the expense and
risk of the intermediary, for any form of
credit or investment in securities,
regardless of the contractual or legal
modality followed or the type of document,
electronic registration or any similar
instrument employed to formalize the
transactions. . . ."
This
description clearly defines financial
intermediation, and to classify any action as
such, it must meet all of the particular
criteria set forth. Specifically, the crime
involves the habitual gathering of resources
for the purpose of credit or investment in
securities (i.e., stocks and bonds). For the
classification of this crime, it is not enough
to engage in fund gathering or to do so
habitually, for that is only the first part of
the definition and does not therefore in and
of itself, constitute a crime. We certainly
accept, reiterate and acknowledge in this case
that Luis Enrique Villalobos did indeed engage
in fund gathering by receiving checks and cash
from banking and other financial institutions
regulated and monitored both inside and
outside the country. The investors would
deposit their money for the purpose of earning
interest paid periodically, trusting that
their money would be returned at the end of
the agreed term. Mr. Villalobos did not
habitually use those funds either for money
lending or for investment in stocks and bonds;
he did possibly invest in business activities
that generated enough profit to pay the agreed
interest rates, with the additional advantage
of having much lower overhead than other
financial institutions.
The case file
contains the names of the investors and the
amounts of their investments, but despite
having raided the offices and confiscated
thousands of documents, after a year and a
half of investigation, there is absolutely no
evidence that Mr. Villalobos was using the
gathered funds for money lending or investment
in securities. Observe that the
above-mentioned Article 116 establishes not
only the criterion of investing the funds but
also that of investing those funds in
securities.
The most
deplorable action on the part of the
Prosecutor in this case is that he has simply
ignored the SUGEF's technical opinion, thus
failing to maintain the level of objectivity
required by articles 6 and 63 of the Criminal
Process Code. It is truly surprising that,
notwithstanding the fact that twice (the first
time publicly in November 2002 through the
written press) the responsible State body for
determining the existence of financial
intermediation has indicated that the criteria
for financial intermediation have not been met
in Mr. Villalobos's case, the Prosecutor
persists in going on with the investigation of
the matter.
In November
2002 the SUGEF published a paid announcement
in which it clearly indicated that in its
opinion, the Villalobos brothers and the
companies they own had not engaged in
financial intermediation. Perhaps one could
hypothesize that the Prosecutor does not read
the newspapers or that he has not grasped the
technical opinion presented in the report.
What is unacceptable is that since July 2002
and for eight months thereafter he did not
formally request the SUGEF's opinion, even
though it is the technical body with the
expertise needed to determine the existence of
financial intermediation. It was not until
the defendant Villalobos-Camacho demanded it
that testimony was heard from head of the
SUGEF, who in unequivocal clarity stated that
no financial intermediation had been proven,
despite a lengthy investigation of the matter
in search of evidence.
In this
regard, Dr. Bernardo José Alfaro-Araya, the
General Superintendent of Financial Entities,
in a statement given at 10:30 on March 4,
2003, indicated, as recorded in the court
file: ". . . we could not demonstrate that
any financial intermediation had taken place.
I am a financial intermediary, if at my own
expense and risk I gather funds and I
invest them . . . ." Dr. Alfaro adds,
". . .what we did verify was that Mr.
Villalobos gathered funds from third
parties, but we could not prove that he
invested the money in securities or loans . .
. ." Dr. Alfaro further stated
how the SUGEF itself had never determined that
any movements of that type had been engaged
in, whether investments in securities or money
lending, with the investors' monies, but only
that the funds had been gathered. In this
same vein, Dr. Alfaro went on to say: ". .
. based on the depositions taken from Mr. Nash
and Mr. Clinton, we were able to verify
that the money gathered was from third
parties, but we could not determine that
financial intermediation was taking place
. . . ."
What was
surprising and unacceptable in that statement
is the fact that Mr. Roldán, apparently from
OIJ, asserts that the SUGEF cannot say that
there was NO financial intermediation taking
place. In a manifestation that was totally
partial, subjective and unacceptable in a
preliminary procedure aimed at determining the
truth about the facts, the OIJ representative
expects the SUGEF to prove a negative -that no
financial intermediation had occurred. Dr.
Alfaro had already stated clearly that since
1999 they had been investigating Mr.
Villalobos and that they could not prove any
engagement in financial intermediation.
Nonetheless, the Prosecutor and the OIJ want
the SUGEF to tell them what they apparently
want to hear. But since the SUGEF, in its
capacity as a technical body, declares after
four years of investigating Mr. Villalobos,
that there was no financial intermediation,
they [prosecutor and OIJ] then ask the judge
to authorize them to continue the
investigation, having neither the training nor
the technical knowledge necessary to determine
the existence of financial intermediation.
Since July
2002 they have had access to all of the
documents concerning Mr. Villalobos. Since
January 1999 the SUGEF had unsuccessfully
attempted to prove that the Villalobos
brothers were engaging in financial
intermediation. To attempt now to demonstrate
that the case is complex when they have at
their disposal the studied technical opinion
that denies the existence of the crime is an
abuse of power. Certainly the judge ought not
contribute to something so incongruous: This
case is not complex but simple; it is clear
that no financial intermediation was taking
place, as the SUGEF has stated and restated.
The judge should rather reject the case for
the charges of illegal financial
intermediation and request that it be shelved.
Fraud.
Fraud is
another charge the Prosecutor makes against
the Villalobos-Camacho brothers. This one is
just as ludicrous as the others. The Criminal
Justice Office asserts in its well-known
resolution that the fact on which this alleged
commission of this crime is based is that the
brothers promised to pay high interest and the
investors were given as collateral for their
investment a check written with insufficient
funds. In the first place, the interest was
paid religiously every month, until the
Prosecutor ordered the closing of the business
and the Judge consented to it; until
the Prosecutor ordered the freezing of the
accounts and the Judge consented to it.
Obviously, with the business shut down and the
accounts frozen it was materially impossible
to pay interest, even low interest, and much
less return the principal to all of the
depositors. Secondly, the checks do not have
funds because they are to be paid only when a
bank cashier verifies that condition and
indicates the corresponding reason on the
reverse of each check. Before such time, the
check can be cashed, except in the case before
us in which the Judge orders the freezing of
the accounts, making it impossible, funds
or not, to cash even one check.
Weakness of the
fraud charges.
Several
investors have filed suit for the alleged
crime of fraud supposedly committed by the
defendants in this case. All of those suits
were filed subsequent to the start of this
investigation in July 2002, and they demand
that the money collected by Mr. Villalobos be
returned since it is impossible for them to
cash the checks written out to them due to the
freezing of the accounts in the banks of the
National Banking System.
The crime of
fraud is described in Article 216 of the Penal
Code as follows:
"Anyone by
leading another person into error or causing
that person to continue in an erroneous course
through the simulation of false facts or
through the distortion and concealment of the
true facts to obtain illegal patrimonial
benefits for him/herself or for a third party,
who infringes on another's assets, shall be
sanctioned in the following manner:
"1).
"2).
"The
preceding prison sentences shall be increased
by a third whenever the stipulated acts are
carried out by any agent or administrator of
an enterprise that obtains, entirely or
partially its funds from the savings of the
public, or obtains them through anyone, who
personally or through some unregistered
entity, of any nature, that has obtained the
resources either entirely or partially from
the savings of the public."
Fraud is a
patrimonial crime, and the criminality of the
action is derived from a type of deceit
categorized as fraudulency. The Superior
Criminal Appellate Tribunal in Resolution No.
397 issued at 12:25 on May 12, 1997, conceives
of it in the same way:
"Fraudulency, understood as any patrimonial
harm inflicted through deceit, is a generic
definition that encompasses several types,
among which are fraudulent conveyance and
swindling, which are, therefore, special forms
of fraud."
Plainly,
then, fraud has both objective and subjective
components. Within the objective component
there are elements of deceit, misleading of a
passive subject, a dispositive act on the part
of the deceived person and some resulting
economic harm. The subjective component
includes the fraud, which necessarily must be
aimed at the aforementioned objective (which
may be direct or incidental). Likewise, the
Court in that same resolution goes on to
clarify:
"The crime
of fraud (for the purposes of sentencing) can
be divided into two major parts, namely the
objective and the subjective. The objective
part of fraud is comprised of four elements:
(a) Some form of ruse or deceit, defined in
the text as the simulation of false facts and
the distortion or concealment of true facts;
(b) An error in the passive subjective -the
deceived person-, whether that person is led
into error or is kept in it; (c) A dispositive
act of the deceived; and, (d) Some economic
damage. And the subjective part of fraud is
dolus (ill-intentioned deceit), which must
necessarily be aimed at the objective part."
All of the
cases directed against the Villalobos-Camacho
brothers are flawed by a serious conceptual
error, which being so obvious ought not have
escaped the intelligence of the Prosecutor
right from the start. In the first place,
there has been no ruse or deception, that is,
a simulation of false facts or a distortion or
concealment of the true facts. For over 15
years Enrique Villalobos ran a system of fund
gathering with payment of interest to the
investors and subsequent return of the
principal invested at the appointed time.
There was never any ruse or deceit, nor was
there any pre-established intent to deceive or
entice people into handing over their money.
In all of the cases known in Costa Rica in
which funds were not returned by the financial
agencies and even banks that have shut down
their operations, complaints are filed when
those entities cease paying their clients of
their own accord and because they are unable
to honor their obligations. The investors
normally arrive some Monday only to find that
the facilities are closed and those
responsible for the business are already
outside of the country without having owned up
to their actions. In this case the situation
is entirely different. Mr. Villalobos'
business serving over 6,000 investors was
totally normal until July 4, 2002. That day
the police shut down the facilities from which
the business operated. They seized papers and
support documentation and froze the accounts
of the defendant Villalobos-Camacho. Despite
that incident, Mr. Villalobos continued to
honor his obligations to return the gathered
funds, until the total shutdown of the
business made it impossible to continue doing
so and the unprecedented incarceration of his
brother prompted him to exit the country.
Observe that the closing of his operations was
not prompted by Mr. Villalobos but rather by a
judge's decision. Then, in the face of the
freezing and immobilizing of his bank
accounts, it was materially impossible to
return the funds gathered, being that no means
of transferring funds out of those accounts
was left. All of this clearly demonstrates
the non-existence of any fraud aimed at the
objective parties to their economic detriment.
It is
revealing to observe that all of these fraud
accusations came about after the operations
and accounts were shut down by the judicial
authorities, which suggests that at no time
was the economic damage, with which the
investors are still being inflicted, ever
instigated by Mr. Villalobo-Camacho's
decision, but rather was produced by an
external decision beyond the control of the
defendant.
It is quite
evident that Mr. Villalobos could not have
foreseen the closing of his operations and his
accounts with an eye to reneging on his
obligations, since that would mean even the
Judicial Power and the Prosecutor would have
to be accomplices of the alleged fraud.
Neither is it
logical to suppose that the Prosecutor would
claim that the economic damage and the failure
to fulfill the obligation of returning the
money has somehow magically transformed a
civil offense into a crime punishable by
something akin to a debtors' prison.
One
distinguishes no complexity to this case,
because there is no case. Clearly, there has
been no scheme aimed at the objective type of
fraud, nor any ruse or deceit devised by Mr.
Villalobos to swindle the investors out of
their money. It is remarkable that the
accusations were not discarded at the onset.
The crime of fraud could have been alleged, if
Mr. Villalobos had suddenly and voluntarily
shut down his own operations and immediately
fled the country, which would have been
indicative of a premeditated ruse or deceit.
However, it didn't happen like that; no, the
closing was the result of an external,
uncontrollable action. It is preposterous to
classify the case as complex merely on the
basis of the number of victims, when it is
clear there was never any deception aimed at
committing fraud, as was already shown.
Hence, we see
in this specific case there has been
absolutely no fraud, being that the element of
deception is missing, because the Villalobos
brothers had no intention of deceiving or
tricking anyone. There never was a single
complaint filed by any investor until Mr.
Villalobos' accounts were frozen, and it
obvious that under those conditions it is
impossible to return the money. It is
important to add also that the accusations
made for the crime of fraud were not initiated
until after July 3 and 5, 2002 (the dates on
which the Criminal Court of the First Criminal
Circuit of San Jose ordered the immobilization
of the money), and the lawsuits were filed by
Attorney Acuña in September 2003.
Likewise, it
is clear that Mr. Villalobos never had any
intention of appropriating any money for
himself, since the freezing of the accounts is
the real cause of not returning the invested
funds.
Weakness of the
resolution related to the freezing of the
accounts.
The Criminal
Court's resolution issued on April 25, 2003
states that the freezing of the accounts of
the defendants and their enterprises is based
on the application of articles 110 of the
Penal Code and 198 and 199 of the Criminal
Process Code. It must be remembered that thus
far the only charges that have been
investigated are for the crime of illegal
financial intermediation, and based on that
alleged offense, Osvaldo Villalobos-Camacho
has been jailed (under the pretext of
preventive custody), raids and seizures have
been conducted, and the application of the
procedure of complex process for the case has
been requested and granted.
The
regulation cited by the Criminal Justice
Office is totally inapplicable to this case.
The aforementioned articles establish the
following:
"Article 110.- Confiscation
The crime
results in a loss in favor of the State of the
instruments with which the crime was committed
and of the things and values arising from
their use, or which constitute for the agent
some advantage derived from the crime,
excepting the right that the offended party or
third parties may have over those instruments.
Article
198.- Warrant of seizure
The judge,
the Public Ministry and the police may decide
to collect and hold the articles related to a
crime, both those subject to confiscation and
those that could serve as evidence; for that
purpose, whenever necessary, a seizure will be
ordered. In urgent cases, this measure may be
delegated to an executive of the judicial
police.
Article
199.- Seizure procedure
The
provisions prescribed for a search shall be
applied to a seizure. The articles seized
shall be inventoried and placed in
safekeeping.
Copies or
replicas of the objects sequestered may be
made whenever the originals could disappear or
be altered or they are difficult to keep, or
whenever it is advantageous to do so for
investigation."
It is clear,
then, that the financial resources collected
from the investors are not objects related to
the crime of illegal financial intermediation,
and much less instruments used to commit the
crime, nor are they valuables produced through
committing the crime. Even if that crime had
been committed, certainly the frozen funds
belong to third parties, since the Criminal
Justice Office itself permits such actions.
It is completely illegal to hold those funds
whenever the conditions of the mentioned
regulation are not met. Moreover, what the
judge concludes, saying that the sequestered
funds are only a small portion of the total
amount invested, is totally improper, because
that statement actually reflects the fact that
those resources belong to third parties and
not the defendants. Purporting that the
freezing of accounts is justified because of
alleged money laundering would oblige the
Prosecutor and the Judge to follow the
procedure established in the Narcotics Law in
notifying the possible interested third
parties with the greatest rights, which has
thus far not been done.
SIXTEENTH
POINT:
The Court and
Appellate Tribunal granted the Prosecutor an
absolutely inappropriate process of complex
procedure, which allowed him to lengthen the
terms in which to complete the investigative
phase.
This type of
procedure is regulated by Article 376 and
articles following of the Criminal Process
Code, which states:
"Whenever
the process is complex because of the
multiplicity of actions, the large
number of defendants or victims or with
any case related to the investigation of
any form of organized crime, the court,
through an official letter o request from the
Public Ministry shall authorize, by a
well-founded resolution, the application of
special norms contemplated under this Title .
. . ."
(The boldface
is ours).
For this
case, the requirements established in the
above-cited article are lacking. The wording
of the article indicates that this has to do
with an exception procedure and as Lic.
Rosario Fernández-Vindas well states in her
article entitled "Complex Process Matters,"
contained in the collective work, Reflexiones
sobre el Nuevo Proceso Penal (Reflections on
the New Criminal Process), only in exceptional
cases, and only with timely notification of
those affected, is it to be authorized. The
interpretation for the application of this
process is to be restricted, inasmuch as the
extension of time limits will affect the
rights of the defendants and the victims,
placing at risk the application of the right
to timely, consistent justice and to be tried
in a reasonable time frame, as established by
the Political Constitution, the San Jose Pact
and Article 379 itself of the Criminal Process
Code.
It is
important to point out that the first thing
the Prosecutor must prove when he requests the
application of this procedure is that there
indeed exists a clear and unmistakable
difficulty in processing the case, because
first the complexity of the case must be
established and then the reasons for the
request studied to ensure that they line up
with those specifically stipulated in Article
376. It can well be that there are a large
number of victims without there being any
difficulty in processing the case, or that
there are multiple facts involved but which
are easy to process: The legislature required
that first one establish the complexity of the
process and that the complexity was for one of
the cited reasons. Thus, if the complexity of
the case is due to any of the causes
enumerated, the procedure may be authorized;
on the other hand, if there are a large number
of defendants or victims, or many facts
involved, or even if organized crime is
involved, but, ". . .if there is no
complexity or difficulty in the investigation,
the procedure of complex process shall not be
authorized" (Fernández, p. 766).
For the 18
months that the Attorney General has been
conducting an investigation of the case within
the preliminary procedure, he has not found
any evidence or even sufficient indications to
transform the charges made into an indictment,
according to Article 303 of the Criminal
Process Code. One of those charges has been
under investigation since 1999 – four years -
and the Prosecutor to date has not been able
to find enough evidence upon which to base
even one indictment.
It is clear
that the purpose of the preliminary procedure
is to determine if there are any grounds for a
trial, through the gathering of information
that would make it possible to found an
indictment and build a defense (Article 274 of
the Criminal Process Code). Nevertheless, it
is obvious that to begin the preliminary
procedure, and especially when preventive
custody is requested, and raids and
confiscations have been ordered, the
Prosecutor should have done a prior study so
as to determine whether there was any fairly
sound reason for doing so. Otherwise, the
Prosecutor would order the arrest of people
and carry out confiscations and raids with the
authorization of the Judge with no
justification whatsoever. We believe that in
this case a long enough time has elapsed for
the completion of the preliminary procedure,
be it through rejecting the case, dismissal or
any other conclusive act specified in Article
299 of the Criminal Process Code, or else by
presenting an indictment requiring the opening
of a trial, as stipulated in Article 303 of
the same code.
In this case
the Judge has granted all of the Prosecutor's
requests: Throughout 18 months the Judge has
permitted the Prosecutor to raid offices and
premises of the defendants, confiscate
articles they own and even some that belong to
the depositing investors, access all the
papers and supporting documents of the
companies of the defendants, and since
November 2002, facilitated by a judicial
order, to detain in prison one of the
defendants under the pretext of preventive
custody. On the other hand, he has
consistently rejected requests to cease the
preventive custody measures while receiving
all the technical information from the
responsible government agency in charge of
overseeing financial intermediation, such as
the General Superintendence of Financial
Entities. For 18 months the Prosecutor has
had access to the list of investors and has
encouraged the filing of criminal charges for
fraud in the Victims Protection Office.
The
resolution of the Criminal Court of San Jose
issued on 16:45 on April 25, 2003, by the
Criminal Court of San Jose, which declared
this case to be of Complex Process is not duly
founded, contravening the provisions of
Article 376 of the Criminal Process Code.
Observe that to date the only charges
investigated are those related to the crime of
illegal financial intermediation allegedly
committed by the Villalobos brothers, being
that the Prosecutor supports his request
exclusively on that basis. The Judge backs
him and grants that petition based on a scant
15-line paragraph, in which he affirms that
the cause is complex due to the multiplicity
of facts and the large number of victims
involved. Let us analyze these circumstances.
The Judge
asserts that there are a multiplicity of facts
involved in the case, because the gathering of
funds from the public was maintained over the
years and generated countless facts, which is
certainly debatable. The facts pertaining to
the crime of illegal financial intermediation
do not need to be investigated with respect to
fund gathering, because that has been duly
proven and accepted. It is not necessary to
investigate whether there was any fund
gathering taking place, because that is quite
evident, proven in the legal file and accepted
by the defendants. What does not exist, and
shall be shown, is any evidence whatsoever of
involvement in money lending or investment in
securities using the financial resources
gathered. Hence the resolution is improperly
supported.
The other
criteria the Judge relies on to establish that
the case is complex is even weaker. The cited
crime is defined in the Organic Law of the
Central Bank of Costa Rica without
establishing the legally protected asset,
which shows that it is dealing with a
victimless crime, typically serious and is
constituted by a fraudulent, objective act.
The only thing affected by illegal financial
intermediation is the legal code itself, the
law and the SUGEF's dignity, but the law is
not established for the purpose of protecting
legal patrimonial assets. It may well be that
a financial intermediary acts illegally, but
fully honors its obligations and the agreed
payment of interest, and likewise returns the
principle upon expiration of the contracted
term. This shows that this has to do with a
formal crime.
The alleged
victims are not victims then because of the
alleged commission of that crime, but because,
it seems, that the Prosecutor and the Judge
are referring to the accusations for fraud.
The weakness is evident in the total lack of
grounds in this sense, which will be dealt
with in greater depth below.
SEVENTEENTH POINT:
Judge Sánchez
alters the Prosecutor's petition and is not
capable of carrying out his own decisions.
This past
January 22, Prosecutor Walter Espinoza, in
charge of the Villalobos case requested that
Judge Francisco Sánchez extend the house
arrest order against Osvaldo
Villalobos-Camacho for another four months,
leaving open the possibility of requesting new
extensions. In other words, the Prosecutor
was clear in the sense that Osvaldo should
stay home under a so-called house arrest. At
no time did he ask to suspend the house arrest
nor that the defendant be incarcerated.
Nonetheless,
in a completely inexplicable act, Judge
Sánchez ruled this past January 27 to rescind
the house arrest order for Osvaldo Villalobos
and dictated his preventive custody for a
period of three months, expiring in April 27
of this year. Even worse, the Judge asserts
at the beginning of the resolution that the
Prosecutor had recommended the preventive
custody, when in reality it was quite the
contrary, as pointed out. The judge
prevaricates and bases his resolution on a
falsehood and even states that he is granting
the Prosecutor's petition that the house
arrest be rescinded and preventive custody be
dictated, when the truth is the Prosecutor had
backed the house arrest.
But the
lamentable role of Judge Sánchez does not end
there. In the last page of the resolution,
the Judge establishes that Osvaldo must be
placed in a Police Force Headquarters rather
than in the Penitentiary System, citing his
health as the reason, and nevertheless allows
the person whose freedom he ought to ensure to
be sent to a jail, in stark contradiction to
his own decision. Since last February 3, when
the resolution was legally challenged, Judge
Sánchez has not owned up to his action nor
addressed this deplorable situation. Perhaps
over the next few days the Constitutional
Court or even the Superior Criminal Court will
repeal that preventive custody order on Mr.
Villalobos. But once again Judge Sánchez
erroneously interprets and applies the Law and
in so doing, tramples on the rights of a
citizen, when it is his duty to defend them.
EIGHTEENTH
POINT:
The Prosecutor
and the Judge are arbitrary in this case and
omit the investigation of the Banks in which
the Canadians deposited their monies.
From the
onset of this case, the Defense has requested
consideration of the fact that the Canadian
Government had solicited reports of all of the
financial entities in which the Canadian
citizens under investigation had deposited
funds. Thus far, from at least two banks,
deposit records were found pertaining to those
two Canadians, and yet the Prosecutor does not
apply the same criteria and zeal in the
process and opens no case against the people
in charge of those entities. He takes note of
this fact, but he shirks his duties, thus
causing one to believe that he must have a
persecutory attitude against the Villalobos
brothers. It does not concern him that the
Canadians opened bank accounts in Costa Rica,
but only that they might have had investments
with the Ofinter firm, Luis Enrique or Osvaldo
Villalobos.
NINETEENTH
POINT:
The Prosecutor
recognizes that there is no evidence as to the
existence of accounts of the Canadians with
the Villalobos Brothers, yet he continues with
the case.
The origin of
the case against the Villalobos brothers, as
indicated earlier, was the Letter of Request
sent by the Canadian Government in June 2002.
The letter alleged that the Canadians had
deposits with the Villalobos brothers and that
could possibly evidence the Villalobos
brothers' participation in the crime of money
laundering. Believe it or not, after 18
months of investigation, the Prosecutor only
manages to write on January 22, 2004, in a
communication addressed to Judge Sánchez,
folio 1961 of the file, that the only
evidence of the value of the account is a
promissory note presently located at the
condominium in Playa Jacó, Costa Rica, which
was not found during the initial raid of the
condominium on July 4, 2002. This
sentence is transcribed verbatim from the
Prosecutor's record. Incredible indeed that
after 18 months of investigation, the
Prosecutor would acknowledge that there is
absolutely no proof that the Canadians had any
accounts with the Villalobos brothers --
because the alleged promissory note was not
found in July 2002, 18 months before. I hope
Prosecutor Espinoza does not expect us to
believe that the promissory note that
supposedly exists could somehow appear two
years after the raid, considering that the
place has not been under any kind of
surveillance or care.
The
Prosecutor's phrase is a monument to ignorance
and ill-will. To assert that a promissory
note would be found in a place 18 months after
the first fruitless search, is characteristic
of a negligent, careless official, to say the
least. But it seems rather the result of a
desperate person who has made irresponsible
statements, which now he is unable to prove.
If the promissory note is the only evidence of
the alleged investment, and it did not show up
in the raid of the condominium in July 2002,
it simply does not exist, and even it were
found there and was not seized, after so many
months, the sudden appearance of such a
document would be absolutely spurious. A
responsible Prosecutor should admit that he
has no evidence at all of the existence of the
Canadians' investment with the Villalobos
brothers, other than the statements made in
Canada without the oversight of the Defense
and with no investigative findings to back
them up.
TWENTIETH
POINT:
The Prosecutor
falsifies the truth in relation to the
accusation against Sandra Kerwin St. Onge in
Canada.
In folio 1960
of the case file, the Prosecutor states that
the Ms. Kerwin-St. Onge was accused of the
crime of "profit derived from a crime
related to assets in Costa Rica." That
accusation did not previously exist, and it is
from such statements about that woman that the
deduction arises concerning the existence of
the aforementioned promissory note. The only
assets referred to in the Canadians' case is
the condominium purchased in Jacó and the
Canadian Judge's request to claim the money
allegedly deposited with the Villalobos
brothers. But since the request was signed on
March 10, 2003, no formal steps have been
taken in Costa Rica nor does there exist any
proof that it was ever sent to this country
through the corresponding channels.
The
Prosecutor again alters the facts and makes
statements that he knows are untrue, with the
intent to confuse the Judge and public
opinion.
TWENTY-FIRST POINT:
The Prosecutor
has improved his knowledge in the criminal
matter of illegal financial intermediation but
still does not understand it.
Throughout
the process of the investigation, the
Prosecutor has insisted that the criminal
classification of financial intermediation was
constituted by mere fund gathering without
authorization. After repeated arguments
making it very plain that it is also necessary
to demonstrate that those habitually gathered
funds need to be used for money lending or
investment in securities, possibly he finally
read the legal criminal description and became
concerned enough to investigate whether or not
the funds gathered were being used for money
lending or investments in securities. In that
remarkable communication of January 22, he
continues to repeat something no one is
denying, namely, that the Villalobos brothers
were engaged in habitual fund gathering
activities. Now, however, he states that
"a substantial portion" of the money
collected was invested in stocks and bonds
(securities). After asking the OIJ and other
agencies for reports, he found only one
alleged investment, which he also fails to
demonstrate. In folio 1916, he says that on
March 18, 2002, Mr. Osvaldo Villalobos signed
a contract with the Banco Popular to
participate in an investment fund and that on
June 19 he authorized the purchase of Costa
Rican external debt bonds for the amount of
three million dollars and for that purpose
he used checks written by the investors.
Frankly, the
Prosecutor's conclusion is astonishing. First
of all, since there is no record anywhere of
Mr. Villalobos's signed authorization for this
investment, it cannot be stated that it even
occurred. Secondly, after 18 months of
investigation and showing that the Villalobos
brothers collected hundreds of millions of
dollars, there appears only that one alleged
investment, in absolutely secure bonds
pertaining to this country's own external
debt. No one in his right mind would consider
that just one investment reflects a habitual
practice and much less would think that the
purpose of money gathered to pay the rate of
interest that was actually paid to the
investors would have come from those
securities because their rate of interest is
substantially less. In that unproven alleged
investment there was no risk, being that it
had to do with external debt securities issued
by the government of this country.
The other
alleged investments that the Prosecutor tries
to show were made are nothing of the kind.
What was occurring, rather, was the cashing of
checks by a stockbroker, as indicated in folio
1917. To cash a check is definitely not an
investment in securities, even though the
stockbroker may do it, and if that firm is not
authorized to engage in the activity, that is
not the responsibility of the Villalobos
brothers.
TWENTY-SECOND POINT:
The Prosecutor's
document dated 22 January 2004 is incorrectly
collated and in that manner was supposedly
read by Judge Sánchez.
Starting at
folio 1921 of the file, the data entry
operator working at the Prosecutor's office,
who typed the document, erred in his work, and
from folio 1922 to 1935 the document is
repeated, without anyone having noticed it,
much less Prosecutor Espinoza, who is the one
who signed it. With this error, the document
is practically incomprehensible, but that is
no problem for a person who receives without
any intention of reading it.
TWENTY-THIRD POINT:
A mysterious
document appears named "Alternative Emergency
System" that for the Prosecutor represents
proof that the Villalobos Brothers intended to
evade their legal responsibilities to the
investors, a totally unacceptable
interpretation.
From folio
1962 and following, Prosecutor Espinosa refers
to a mysterious document that he found 18
months after the initial sequester and
which bears no signature of the person
responsible. From its text, one gathers that
there supposedly was a meeting of attorneys to
review a case of a possible criminal
accusation by the investors. The Prosecutor
assumes that is proof of an alleged fraud,
because according to him, they were preparing
to cease payment of the investors, which would
have adversely affected their patrimonial
rights. That estimation is totally
unacceptable. If the Villalobos brothers had
devised some type of fraud, they would not
have left a written record of their
intentions. If they had done that, they would
have fled the country long ago, taking with
them the money of the investors, especially
when we realize that the alleged minutes are
from a meeting that took place on May 12,
1999, over three years before the
beginning of the criminal case, the sequester
of the documents and the freezing of the
accounts. The records reveal that at no time
were the Villalobos brothers planning to leave
the country, and much less were they preparing
to stop paying the investors. They were
simply referring to the appropriate document
to give as a guarantee to the investors, and
it was suggested that they use a bill of
exchange instead of a check, because that
would be more appropriate.
To deduce
that an unsigned document dated three years
before the onset of the case and that in this
way the alleged fraud was being planned, is
entirely consistent with the arbitrary,
slipshod manner in which the Prosecutor has
conducted this whole process of investigation,
infringing on the rights of thousands of
investors, with absolutely no grounds.
(end)
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